Are the forms of words systematically related to their meaning? The arbitrariness of the sign has long been a foundational part of our understanding of human language. Theories of communication predict a relationship between length and meaning, however: Longer descriptions should be more conceptually complex. Here we show that both the lexicons of human languages and individual speakers encode the relationship between linguistic and conceptual complexity. Experimentally, participants mapped longer words to more complex objects in comprehension and production tasks and across a range of stimuli. Explicit judgments of conceptual complexity were also highly correlated with implicit measures of study time in a memory task, suggesting that complexity is directly related to basic cognitive processes. Observationally, judgments of conceptual complexity for a sample of real words correlate highly with their length across 80 languages, even controlling for frequency, familiarity, imageability, and concreteness. While word lengths are systematically related to usage-both frequency and contextual predictability-our results reveal a systematic relationship with meaning as well. They point to a general regularity in the design of lexicons and suggest that pragmatic pressures may influence the structure of the lexicon.
Introduction
Human languages are systems for encoding information about the world. A defining feature of a symbolic coding system is that there is no inherent mapping between the form of the code and what the code denotes (Peirce, 1931)-the color red holds no natural relationship to the meaning 'stop,' the numeral 3 holds no natural relationship to three units, and in language, the word ''horse" looks or sounds nothing like the four-legged mammal it denotes. This arbitrariness of the linguistic sign has long been observed as a fundamental and universal property of natural language (Hockett, 1960; Saussure, 1916 Saussure, , 1960 . And, despite the growing number of cases suggesting instances of nonarbitrariness in the lexicon (see Dingemanse, Blasi, Lupyan, Christiansen, & Monaghan, 2015; Schmidtke, Conrad, & Jacobs, 2014 , for reviews), there is clear evidence for at least some degree of arbitrariness in language based only on the observation that different languages use different words to denote the same meaning (e.g., the word for horse in English is ''horse" but is ''at" in Turkish).
However, the arbitrary character of language holds only from the perspective of the analyst observing a language system from the outside; from the perspective of an individual speaker, the goal of communication provides a strong constraint on arbitrariness. Perhaps this communicative constraint-roughly, that if my words were any different, I couldn't use them to talk to you-is why language doesn't seem arbitrary to us. Put another way, Saussure's (1916 Saussure's ( , 1960 insight was an insight because the form of language typically feels just right for the use to which we put it, namely talking to other people (Sutherland & Cimpian, 2015) .
A rich body of theoretical work has explored communicative regularities in the use of particular forms to refer to particular types of meanings in context-the study of pragmatics (Clark, 1996; Grice, 1975; Horn, 1984) . Broadly, this work argues that language users assume certain regularities in how speakers refer to meanings, and through these shared assumptions, the symmetry of the otherwise arbitrary character of language is broken. For example, consider a speaker who intends to refer to a particular apple on a table. Because language is a priori arbitrary, there are a range of ways the speaker could convey this meaning (e.g., ''the apple," ''the banana," ''the green apple," ''the green apple next to the plate," etc.), but the speaker is constrained by pragmatic pressures of the communicative context. If the listener also speaks English, the phrase ''the banana" will be an unhelpful way to refer to the apple. Furthermore, if there is only one apple on the table, the phrase ''the green apple" will be unnecessarily verbose given the referential context. These constraints might lead a speaker to http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.04.003 0010-0277/Ó 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
